THE EDITOR: The announcement of a $45 million mall to be built at Independence Square, Port of Spain, designed to house just 22 micro and small businesses at a rent of $500 per month has generated much fanfare, but also raises serious questions about its long-term viability and fiscal rationale.
While presented as a symbol of economic empowerment and urban renewal, the maths reveals an annual revenue of $528,000, meaning the investment will take over 85 years to break even, not including maintenance, inflation, or operational costs.
Unfortunately for TT, this is just another financial risk at a time we cannot afford. It also is a reflection of a broader pattern of government intervention in urban spaces that has often proven unsustainable not just in TT, but across the globe.
Governments across the world have attempted similar ventures with mixed results. In the US, numerous city-owned malls from the 1960s to the 1980s, especially in downtown cores similar to Independence Square, have failed and become derelict.
Notably, Baltimore’s once-heralded Harborplace and the St Louis Centre collapsed under the weight of poor management, limited flexibility, and misalignment with consumer trends.
In South Africa, the government-led Gauteng SMME hub in Soweto struggled with low foot traffic, poor business support, and heavy maintenance costs, eventually requiring private-sector intervention to remain viable.
Even more worrying for the planned shopping complex is the narrative of “incubation” for small businesses without clearly defined support mechanisms to help them transition into a competitive market. Rental subsidies without complementary access to capital, mentorship, digital tools, or regulatory ease simply delay the inevitability of failure once state support is withdrawn.
On the other hand, there are success stories of public-private urban renewal. Melbourne’s Queen Victoria Market revitalisation was successful due to city ownership, but with private sector operational management and robust integration with urban transport, tourism, and cultural programming.
Similarly, Singapore's HDB-managed neighbourhood centres work because of a strong hybrid model of public infrastructure paired with tenant autonomy, market-aligned pricing, and support services tailored to business growth.
The idea that this model still being proposed by the government will continuously cycle new entrepreneurs is noble, but from an evidence-based standpoint inherently flawed. Most micro-businesses need three-five years just to stabilise, meaning the rotation and turnover envisioned by the government is either unrealistic or indicative of high failure rates.
If the objective is to stimulate real entrepreneurial growth, that capital invested could have funded multiple district-level entrepreneurship hubs or small co-operative markets, each far more accessible, adaptable, and sustainable.
It could have seeded revolving loan funds for urban young men, women-led businesses, offer grants for digital training, or support urban agr
